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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the logic and morality of the German Stem Cell
Act of 2002. After a brief description of the law’s scope and intent, its
ethical dimensions are analysed in terms of symbolic threats, indirect
consequences, and the encouragement of immorality. The conclu-
sions are twofold. For those who want to accept the law, the argu-
ments for its rationality and morality can be sound. For others, the
emphasis on the uniqueness of the German experience, the combi-
nation of absolute and qualified value judgments, and the lingering
questions of indirect encouragement of immoral activities will prob-
ably be too much.
INTRODUCTION
Embryonic stem cell research causes great ethical
controversy, and it has provoked a variety of legis-
lative responses around the world. A view shared by
many Europeans seems to be that there is something
unethical about embryonic stem cell research, but
that the promises it holds are too great to be dis-
missed. There is, however, very little consensus on
exactly how evil embryonic stem cell research is and
why – and, consequently, under which conditions it
should and should not be allowed. The current
European responses vary from the liberal views of
the United Kingdom, Belgium and Sweden, the only
three countries in which the creation of embryos for
research purposes is allowed, to the restrictive views
of countries like Austria, Lithuania and Poland,
which do not allow the procurement of human
embryonic stem cells (even) from supernumerary
embryos.1 Different justifications have been given to
allow some types of stem cell research and to ban
other types. Philosophically, the most interesting
and most comprehensive solution to the problem of
‘benefiting from evil’ is the German legal position on
human embryonic stem cell research.
On 25 April 2002, the German Parliament passed
a new law concerning the use of imported stem cell
lines in research, the Stem Cell Act, which took
effect on 1 July 2002.2 This complements the earlier
legislation regulating the creation of embryonic
1 European Consortium for Stem Cell Research (EuroStemCell). 2006.
Regulations in EUMember States regarding hES cell research. Available
at: http://www.eurostemcell.org/Documents/Outreach/stemcell_hesc_
regulations_2006feb.pdf [Accessed 24 Nov 2006].
2 Deutscher Bundestag. 2002. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Sicherstellung
des Embryonenschutzes im Zusammenhang mit Einfuhr und Verwen-
dung menschlicher embryonaler Stammzellen (Stammzellgesetz –
StZG). Berlin. Bundestagsdrucksache 14/8394.
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stem cells from human blastocysts: the Embryo Pro-
tection Act3 and the German Basic Law.4 All three
laws, and their framework and implications, have
been extensively discussed in biolegal and bioethical
literature.5
The most notable detail in the otherwise restric-
tive German set of regulations is that the Stem Cell
Act permits, with qualifications, the use of human
embryonic stem cell lines created outside Germany
before the date stated in the Act, 1 January 2002.6
The Embryo Protection Act has prohibited the
production of human embryonic stem cell lines in
Germany since 1990, stating that this would violate
the rights and dignity of embryos as human beings.7
The question is, how can the German legislative
body condone, after the fact, foreign activities that it
does not condone any more, and has not allowed in
Germany to begin with? Is this a case of hypocrisy,
or is there a rational justification for the distinction?
One answer, and quite possibly the correct one, is
that the German law is the result of a political com-
promise, or an opaque process of political bargain-
ing. Some support for this view is provided by the
history of the implementation of the Stem Cell Act,
where concerns about the freedom of research, also
protected by the German Basic Law,8 were paraded
against the concerns about the dignity of unborn
human beings.9
Since this answer is, however, ethically and philo-
sophically uninteresting, the starting point and
hypothesis of this paper is that a morally sound and
rationally acceptable justification for the German
legal situation exists. The hypothesis will be tested
by taking the following steps.
We shall first sketch, or reconstruct, the German
position on human embryonic stem cell research in
terms that we can understand.10 We shall then go on
to list some of the main reasons against using the
results of immoral practices, as presented in a recent
contribution by Ronald M. Green. This is by no
means the only approach to the issue, but it is useful
in two respects. It picks out some of the most im-
portant aspects of the debate. And it does this in a
sufficiently incomplete, or open-ended, way, to
allow certain further specifications. The next step
will be to isolate for more detailed discussion two
specific topics, namely the morally contaminating
effect of benefiting from past or present wrongdo-
ing, and the indirect encouragement of morally
dubious activities. We shall then assess the impact of
the ethical analysis on the German legal position,
and argue that while it is not necessarily indefen-
sible, it is nonetheless rather fragile. In conclusion,
we shall apply the analysis to a possible future case,
the import to Germany of therapies developed in
other countries by stem cell research prohibited in
Germany.
THE GERMAN LEGAL POSITION
The ethically interesting core of the German legisla-
tion concerning human embryonic stem cell
research can be encapsulated in four observations.
These observations make up a legal case for the
position without necessarily raising too many con-
troversial moral issues.11
(i) Germany does not want to allow the creation of
human embryonic stem cell lines in the country.
This would involve the destruction and viola-
tion of totipotent12 human embryos who are,
according to the Embryo Protection Act,
3 Deutscher Bundestag. 1990. Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen
(Embryonenschutzgesetz – EschG). Berlin. Bundesgesetzblatt 8/2746.
4 Grundgesetz. 1949. The German Basic Law, The Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May.
5 An overview of the stem cell debate more generally is provided by S.
Holm. Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy. Bioethics
2002; 16: 493–507.
6 Stammzellgesetz, section 4.
7 Grundgesetz, article 1; Embryonenschutzgesetz.
8 Grundgesetz, article 5:3.
9 T. Heinemann & L. Honnefelder. Principles of Ethical Decision
Making Regarding Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Germany. Bioet-
hics 2002; 16: 530–543, p. 534.
10 This comes close to applying the ‘principle of charity’ to the German
view which is, to us, very difficult to understand if the original turns of
phrase are used. Cf. R.P. Churchill. 1986. Becoming Logical: An Intro-
duction to Logic. New York: St. Martin’s Press: p. 58. See also S. Holm.
2003. ‘Parity of reasoning’ arguments in bioethics – some methodologi-
cal considerations. In Scratching the surface of bioethics. M. Häyry and
T. Takala, eds. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi: 47–56, pp. 53–55.
11 Our description comes close to the one provided by Heinemann and
Honnefelder, op. cit. note 9, but the terminology is, from time to time,
different.
12 Totipotent (or ‘omnipotent’) embryos and stem cells can, by defini-
tion, develop into fully-developed human beings, whereas embryos and
stem cells which are not totipotent (or ‘omnipotent’) cannot. See Hei-
neman and Honnefelder, op. cit. note 9, pp. 532–533.
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entitled to full protection against violations of
their dignity and rights. The protection granted
to them should be equal to the protection
extended to fully-developed human beings.
Embryo research is allowed, when it is possible
that the particular embryo subjected to scrutiny
can benefit from it, but it is not allowed for
purely non-therapeutic purposes.
(ii) Germany does not want to allow the use of
human embryonic stem cell lines produced in
the country (if any)13 while the Embryo Protec-
tion Act has been in force.14 This would mean
condoning, after the fact, crimes committed in
the past, on grounds of present or future utility.
Doing so would be analogous to accepting the
use of results of Nazi medicine in current
research or practice, and this would evoke con-
siderable symbolic concerns.
(iii) Germany does not want to allow, in Germany,
the use of human embryonic stem cell lines pro-
duced in other countries after the implementa-
tion of the Stem Cell Act, because this would
encourage, in other countries, activities which
would be illegal in Germany.
(iv) Germany allows, in Germany, the use of
human embryonic stem cell lines produced in
other countries before the implementation of the
Stem Cell Act, on grounds of present and
future utility, and in the name of the freedom of
research.
The permissive norm described in (iv) is, as far as
we can tell, different from the restrictive norms
described in (i)–(iii), insofar as the symbolism,
domain, and implications of norm (iv) differ from
those of the others in important respects. Let us
briefly sketch these possible contrasts.
(iv) v. (i) The stem cells in the lines that can legiti-
mately be used are not currently totipotent, and
their utilisation does not therefore present a
threat to the rights and dignity safeguarded by the
Embryo Protection Act. They are only pluripo-
tent, and do not, as such, have the ability to
develop into fully-developed human beings.15
Even if their totipotency could be restored, there
would be no obligation to do so.16
(iv) v. (ii) Germany cannot claim validity for
German law in other countries. Hence there is no
crime to be condoned before or after the fact by
utilising stem cell lines created elsewhere. Fur-
thermore, since other nations do not share Ger-
many’s Nazi past, the symbolic aspects which
prevent the use of ‘evil science’ there are not nec-
essarily decisive anywhere else.
(iv) v. (iii) The permission to use previously
created stem cell lines, when combined with a firm
refusal to utilise any newer material, does not
encourage the development of further lines in
other countries.
This, in a nutshell, could be the case for current
German legislation concerning human embryonic
stem cell research. Let us now turn to the ethical
dimensions of benefiting from activities which are
seen as immoral, or wrong.
GREEN ON BENEFITING FROM EVIL
In his article ‘Benefiting from ‘evil’: An incipient
moral problem in human stem cell research’,
Ronald M. Green lists four reasons for thinking that
people should not make use of the fruits of other
people’s past wrongdoing.17 These are moral conta-
gion, direct encouragement through agency, direct
encouragement through the acceptance of benefit, and
indirect encouragement through the legitimisation of
13 There are currently no known cases of human embryonic stem cell
line creation in Germany. But illegal activities are always a logical
possibility.
14 The first report on creating human embryonic stem cell lines
appeared in 1998, and it is therefore highly improbable that any such
activity would have preceded the Embryo Protection Act of 1990. See
J.A. Thomson et. al. Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human
Blastocysts. Science 1998; 282: 1145–1147.
15 By definition, pluripotent cells have the ability to develop into many
types of specialised tissue, but they cannot, as such, develop into com-
plete human beings.
16 It seems that the German legislator must here, surprisingly, agree
with the view expressed by Michael Tooley in the abortion debate,
according to which we have no obligation to turn potential persons (in
Tooley’s example, kittens) into actual persons (in Tooley’s account, by
administering them a wonder drug). The surprise (although by no
means a discrepancy) is that a fragment of Tooley’s pro-choice argu-
ment seems to occupy an indispensable role in the German legislature’s
pro-life view. See M. Tooley. Abortion and Infanticide. Philos Public
Aff 1972; 2: 37–65, pp. 60–62.
17 R.M. Green. Benefiting from ‘Evil’: An Incipient Moral Problem in
Human Stem Cell Research. Bioethics 2002; 16: 544–556.
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a practice. If none of these reasons is present it is,
according to Green, presumably acceptable to
benefit from other people’s actions even if those
actions can be defined as immoral or evil.
By moral contagion Green means that some acts
performed in the past are still capable of evoking
strong feelings of repugnance in us. If we make use
of the results of these acts, we cannot avoid a sense
of ‘being in touch’ with evil. As an example, Green
cites the case of the multi-volume anatomy text
book published by SS doctors in Vienna in 1943
and 1944, in which murdered Jewish concentration
camp inmates have most probably been depicted.18
Although moved by the book’s origin into thinking
that it must not be used, Green also finds himself
repelled by the idea of having to suppress knowl-
edge. Recognising this emotional conflict, he con-
cludes that the moral contagion argument, while
often personally impressive and unavoidable, is not
a good basis for public recommendations.19
The other three reasons against benefiting from
past evil deeds are related to the causal or concep-
tual connection between these deeds, or similar
deeds in the future, and the party taking advantage
of them.
In the case of direct encouragement through
agency, the parties benefiting from wrongdoing have
themselves commissioned the wrongdoing.20 This
makes them morally responsible for it, as if they had
themselves committed the deed, and their responsi-
bility is often also acknowledged by the law. People
are not normally allowed to gain by performing
immoral acts, or by inciting others to perform them.
By direct encouragement through the acceptance of
benefit Green refers to cases where there is no agency
relationship between the wrongdoing and the
parties benefiting from it. The moral mistake in
these cases is that instead of drawing attention to the
deeds of the culprits, we silently condone these by
ignoring the immorality and enjoying the advan-
tages resulting from it. This is likely to embolden the
culprits, and to increase directly the incidence of
similar wrongs in the future.21
Green’s final category is indirect encouragement
through the legitimisation of a practice. His main
example is unethical medical research conducted by
Dr Mengele and other Nazis. These people are long
gone, so the question of prompting them to further
immoral action does not arise. But we may still feel
that we do not want to absolve, however abstractly,
practices like this in the past, present, or future. By
doing so we would encourage a practice, or uphold
a public rule, which could not be reasonably
accepted by everyone.22
BENEFITING FROM EVIL AND THE USE
OF HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
LINES
How can Green’s analysis be applied to the case of
making use of human embryonic stem cell lines
created in the past? Let us consider his four reasons
against benefiting from evil one by one. (In the fol-
lowing, we shall assume, with Green and with the
German legislature, that there is indeed something
seriously wrong in attempts to produce embryonic
stem cell lines from scratch, presumably because it is
immoral to destroy embryos who might stand a
chance of becoming fully-developed human beings.
This view has been challenged in contemporary
debates, but we shall make the assumption here for
the argument’s sake.)
As for the idea of moral contagion, Green
believes that some people can be repelled by the idea
of using stem cell lines, when they know that these
lines have been initiated by destroying viable
embryos. But he also believes that others, people
who emphasise the beneficial effects of science,
would like to see research into these lines go on
despite the moral contamination.23 Due to these
conflicting emotional responses, it seems that at
least at the level of individual choices we can legiti-
mately decide to benefit from the past destruction
of embryos. (Whether or not this result can be
extended to legislative decisions is another matter.
18 F.B. Charatan. Anatomy Textbook Has Nazi Origins. Br Med J
1996; 313: 1422.
19 Green, op. cit. note 17, pp. 547–548.
20 Ibid: 548–549.
21 Ibid: 549.
22 Ibid: 550–551. The idea of the critical evaluation of practice encour-
agement is more fully explained in R.M. Green, B. Gert & K.D.
Clouser. The Method of Public Morality Versus the Method of Princi-
plism. J Med Philos 1993; 18: 479–491.
23 Green, op. cit. note 17, p. 556, p. 553.
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We shall return to this question as soon as we
have completed our account of Green’s other
conclusions.)
Green’s assessment of the three arguments from
encouragement is based on a presumption, or, as he
prefers to call it, ‘key insight’, according to which
embryo destruction and research into embryonic
stem cell lines are two different and entirely separate
activities.24 Every year, fertility treatments create
thousands of embryos, many of which are eventu-
ally destroyed. The creation of stem cell lines only
involves the use of some of these already doomed
embryos, and the reason for involving them is not
destruction, but the global promotion of human
health and well being.
The separation of embryo destruction and stem
cell research enables Green to argue that those who
benefit from stem cell therapies do not necessarily
encourage immoral practices.25 If they do not actu-
ally commission scientists to kill embryos, they
cannot be accused of direct encouragement through
agency. And if they do not condone fertility treat-
ments, no indirect or practice encouragement takes
place, either.26
Accordingly, Green’s valid conclusion (from his
chosen premises) seems to be that individuals who
have not provoked scientists to destroy embryos,
and who do not support or vindicate fertility treat-
ments, can justifiably benefit from the beneficial
results of human embryonic stem cell research.
This conclusion is, in and of itself, slightly para-
doxical, as it states that only people who reject a
certain practice they see as immoral, in this case
fertility medicine, can legitimately benefit from it.27
We shall come back to this point later. But the first
critical issue in the context of this paper is the
extension of the individual viewpoint to legislative
decisions, which may be different in important
respects.
MORAL CONTAGION AND COMPLICITY
If Green’s conclusions are valid, and if they can be
extended to national legislation, then German legis-
lators are right in allowing the use of certain embry-
onic stem cell lines in research, but perhaps only if
they ban fertility treatments which produce excess
embryos to be used in the creation of these lines.
They are, however, in this case on shakier ground in
prohibiting the use of newly developed lines, as the
argument invoked by Green does not distinguish
between past, present and future deeds.
But are his views on contagion sound, and is the
extension legitimate? Some considerations related to
the symbolism of moral contamination seem to indi-
cate that they are not.
Referring to the case of unethical Nazi experi-
ments on human beings in concentration camps,
Stephen S. Post argues that they were an abomina-
tion with which no civilised person should want to
be in contact.28 Just as illegally obtained evidence is
inadmissible in a court of law, unethically obtained
data must benefit absolutely no one. Abomination
as a concept draws the line between civilisation and
moral abyss, and unless such a line is drawn between
science and Nazi atrocities, ethical confusion and
chaos will result.
In a more cautious, but also more detailed, con-
tribution Robert S. Pozos considers the case of the
infamous but widely referenced hypothermia experi-
ments conducted by Nazi scientists in Dachau.29
Many people were killed in these attempts to deter-
mine the conditions of survival before and after
immersion leading to hypothermia. Pozos points
out that the use of the results of these experiments
seems to condone the practice of selective dehumani-
sation, where segments of society are defined as
‘undesirable’ and ‘expendable’.30 This can be seen to
convey the message that science is more important
than ethics. According to Pozos, this could lead to a
debasing of humanity, and to the acceptance of a
24 Ibid: 554.
25 Provided that the stem cells come from ‘surplus’ embryos, and that
the embryos are not created solely to be destroyed and utilised for their
stem cells.
26 Green, op. cit. note 17, pp. 554–555.
27 If they approve fertility treatments, they encourage, however indi-
rectly, embryo destruction. Green himself does not draw attention to
this paradox in his article. It is possible that he has missed it altogether.
28 S.G. Post. The Echo of Nuremberg: Nazi Data and Ethics. J Med
Ethics 1991; 17: 42–44.
29 R.S. Pozos. 1992. Scientific Inquiry and Ethics: The Dachau Data. In
A.L. Caplan, ed. When Medicine Went Mad: Bioethics and the Holo-
caust. New Jersey: Humana Press: 95–108.
30 Ibid: 105.
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utilitarian31 society where individuals do not have
rights over and above the dictates of science and
expediency.32
To a certain extent, the abomination involved in
the use of tainted results can be more serious in the
case of nations than it is in the case of individuals.
Green uses the example of Catholic parents who
have to decide whether or not to allow stem cell
therapy on their child who is seriously ill.33 The
interests of an individual are in this case balanced
against the past wrong. But when the scientific
community, or a nation, makes decisions which
are superficially similar, they engage in a different
weighing exercise, where it is more possible that the
rights and interests of individuals are subjected to a
more collective (or ‘utilitarian’) concept of welfare.
How relevant is the Nazi abomination argument,
if sound, in the context of the German law concern-
ing human embryonic stem cell lines? It is tempting
to think that a moral wrong is a moral wrong, and
that the use of the fruits of wrongdoing is always
equally condemnable. If this route is taken, it is
difficult to see how evil deeds committed in Decem-
ber 2001 could be radically different from evil deeds
committed in January 2002.
But what if we proceed from the more nuanced
idea that while evil deeds always cast a shadow over
future choices, these choices can still legitimately
differ depending on the degree of evil involved in the
deeds? This could help the German legislators to
distinguish between the use of stem cell lines created
before and after the implementation of the new act.
COMPLICITY AND CONSEQUENCES
In an interesting analysis of the fetal tissue debate,
Lynn Gillam argues that the use of analogy argu-
ments is potentially misleading, if some of the key
premises are not genuinely shared by the parties
involved in a debate.34 Her example is the contro-
versy over the use of fetal tissue, and more particu-
larly the analogy between murder victims and
aborted fetuses that some defenders of the use of
fetal tissue have evoked.35 They have argued that
since physicians are allowed to save lives by using
the organs of homicide victims, they should also be
permitted to use tissue derived from aborted fetuses,
even if fetuses, as persons, were entitled to the full
protection of their human rights, including the right
to life.
Gillam examines the issue of complicity in the
crime that makes organs or tissue available to sur-
geons and scientists in terms of the direct and indi-
rect consequences of policy choices.36 Since murder
is firmly and unequivocally condemned in most con-
temporary societies, she argues that the policy of
utilising the organs of murder victims is not likely to
increase homicide rates, or people’s attitudes con-
cerning the immorality of murdering adult human
beings. Hence it is presumably safe to allow this
practice. Abortion, however, is another matter.
Views on its wrongness vary, and a policy of allow-
ing the use of fetal tissue could more conceivably
alter attitudes and choices in the future. The policy
could be seen as an official approval to perform
abortions, as people might reason that physicians
and medical scientists would not participate in the
exploitation of fetal tissue unless they were con-
vinced that there is nothing seriously wrong with
abortion. Hence it could be unsafe to permit this
practice.
Gillam argues that the only way to escape this
conclusion is to deny fetuses the full protection
granted to (other) homicide victims, and to argue
that increases in abortion rates are not a serious
moral wrong, after all. But then the analogy
between murder victims and aborted fetuses cannot
be sustained, and the argument for the use of fetal
tissue collapses.
In the context of restrictive laws like the German
Embryo Protection Act, it is somehow natural
to assume that they proceed from a very rigid
31 Pozos uses here the word ‘utilitarian’ in the technical meaning
defined by the latter part of the sentence. The connection between this
usage and the doctrine of utilitarianism (as a moral theory) is not
explained in his article.
32 Pozos, op. cit. note 29, pp. 105–106, cf. p. 96. A closely related, and
even more cautious, view regarding the use (specifically, the publica-
tion) of ‘tainted results’ can be found in F. Luna. Vulnerable Popula-
tions and Morally Tainted Experiments. Bioethics 1997; 11: 256–264.
33 Green, op. cit. note 17, pp. 544–546, 553–554.
34 L. Gillam. Arguing by Analogy in the Fetal Tissue Debate. Bioethics
1997; 11: 397–412.
35 Gillam’s article, ibid., contains useful references to this discussion.
These are not cited here, because they are peripheral to our argument.
36 Ibid: 403–408.
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assumption, namely, that the destruction of human
embryos is always exactly as wrong as killing inno-
cent adult human beings. The rhetoric of the laws,
with their references to ‘human dignity’ and ‘invio-
lable rights’, often gives credibility to this notion.
But it is quite possible that the assumption is flawed.
Despite the rhetoric, the legal implications of
destroying an embryo or terminating a pregnancy
differ considerably from the legal implications of
taking the life of an adult human being in these
jurisdictions.37 In the embryonic stem cell debate,
one commentator has even suggested that there
might be an official European ranking which places
the interests of an individual embryo above collec-
tive interests but below the life and health of more
developed human individuals.38
If German legislators hold a qualified view on
unborn human life, then the distinction between
pre-Act and post-Act stem cell lines can again be
defended.39 All they need to say, and show, is that
the consequences and implications of allowing the
use of pre-Act lines are far less threatening than the
consequences and implications of allowing the use
of post-Act lines. The question, of course, is, can
they find support for a statement like this?
THE ARGUMENT FROM PRACTICE
ENCOURAGEMENT REVISITED
One of the four reasons Green cited against benefit-
ing from past wrongdoing was that doing so can
indirectly encourage immoralities through legitimis-
ing practices that cannot be reasonably accepted by
everyone.40 He argued that Catholic parents, who do
not condone fertility treatments, can legitimately
allow their child to be treated by human embryonic
stem cell therapies, because the acceptance of fertil-
ity treatments, and the ensuing embryo destruction,
can be kept apart from the choice of the parents.
Due to the separation, no practice encouragement
occurs.
The situation of German lawgivers is, however,
significantly different, and the argument’s force in
the case of permitting the use of imported stem cell
lines must be reconsidered. Since Germany does not
prohibit fertility treatments, the separation of the
activities is not as complete as in the case of the
parents. On the other hand, if the legislators, unlike
the Catholic parents, hold a qualified view on the
value of embryonic life, fertility treatments can
possibly be seen to promote the reproductive health
of childless individuals,41 in which case the use of
surplus embryos is merely a necessary (albeit ethi-
cally dubious) side effect of a morally acceptable
practice.42
Even if, however, the German legislators do
nothing wrong by condoning fertility treatments,
there can be other questionable practices that the
use of pre-Act as well as post-Act human embryonic
stem cell lines could encourage. This encouragement
could occur either through the consequences of
accepting a particular policy, like Gillam suggests,
or through legitimising unacceptable public rules,
which was Green’s original concern.
The questionable practices and rules suggested in
the literature include, most importantly, (a) the
selective dehumanisation of the most vulnerable
groups,43 (b) the commodification of human beings
and human body parts,44 and (c) the instrumentali-
sation of women as egg producers.45 Let us briefly
discuss the probability and implications of these as
regards the German Stem Cell Act.
37 The maximum penalty for ‘misusing’ human embryos is three years’
imprisonment. Embryonenschutzgesetz.
38 C.M. Romeo-Casabona. Embryonic Stem Cell Research and
Therapy: The Need for a Common European Legal Framework. Bio-
ethics 2002; 16: 557–567, p. 562.
39 By ‘pre-Act’ lines we mean those human embryonic stem cell lines
created before 1 January 2002, and by ‘post-Act’ lines those created
after that date.
40 Green, op. cit. note 17, pp. 550–551.
41 Romeo-Casabona (op. cit. note 38, p. 564) makes this suggestion in
the European context.
42 On the problems of the use of the concept of a ‘spare’ embryo in these
debates, see S. Holm. The Spare Embryo – A Red Herring in the
Embryo Experimentation Debate. Health Care Anal 1993; 1: 63–66.
43 Pozos, op. cit. note 29, p. 105. See also F.S. Oduncu. Stem Cell
Research in Germany: Ethics of Healing vs. Human Dignity. Med
Health Care Philos 2003; 6: 5–16.
44 On this phenomenon, see, e.g. L.S. Cahill. Genetics, Commodifica-
tion, and Social Justice in the Globalization Era. Kennedy Inst Ethics J
2001; 11: 221–238; S. Holland. Contested Commodities at Both Ends of
Life: Buying and Selling Gametes, Embryos, and Body Tissues.
Kennedy Inst Ethics J 2001; 11: 263–284.
45 Holm (op. cit. note 5, pp. 500–501) also discusses the ‘technical
slippery slope towards reproductive cloning’. This argument is not
analysed here, because, if valid, it would provide grounds for prohibit-
ing stem cell research regardless of origin of the lines studied.
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(a) The case against selective dehumanisation states
that we should not accept the division of human
beings into the desirable and the undesirable,
the expendable and the non-expendable. Yet
this is exactly what we do if we destroy embryos
in order to promote the health of other people,
or use the results of embryo-destructive research
conducted in the past. By doing so we send the
message that human beings without voices can
be sacrificed for the well-being of those who can
get themselves heard in the political process.
This case is easily dismissed by those who do not
grant equal rights to unborn human beings, espe-
cially not in the first stages of their development.46
But this route is not open to the German legislators
who are committed to defending the dignity and
rights of embryos as well as adult human beings.
The only way they can defend their position, as far
as we can see, is to emphasise two points. They
cannot allow, even hypothetically, the use of stem
cell lines produced in Germany, because that would
bear a dangerous resemblance to the utilisation of
unethical Nazi medicine. And they cannot allow any
future revisions to the demarcation date set in the
Stem Cell Act.47 If they do, they will indirectly
encourage selectively dehumanising activities in
other countries.
(b) The case against the commodification of human
beings and human body parts is that if people are
allowed to buy and sell organs, gametes, or
other vital or important tissues, they will even-
tually lose the sense of the pricelessness, abso-
lute worth, and dignity of human persons. And
if this happens, then the basis of morality is
presumably shattered and life in societies and
communities becomes difficult.48
The Stem Cell Act allows German scientists to buy
foreign material, the origin of which is, by defini-
tion, human and embryonic. How, then, can they
avoid charges of commodification? The German
response seems to be to regulate tightly the use of
this material. Scientists are only allowed to conduct
studies which aim at progress in human diagnosis,
prevention and therapy; preliminary studies for
these must be extensive; and the import of cell lines
is overseen by a separate ethics commission.49 While
this does nothing to correct the initial immorality of
embryo destruction, it is an attempt to make the
most ethical use of the past wrongdoing.50
(c) The instrumentalisation of women as egg produc-
ers is a future concern which has not been
adequately addressed by any legislature so far.
As Søren Holm has pointed out,51 therapies
developed by stem cell research may, once com-
pleted, require the availability of vast numbers
of eggs, which have to come from women. How
will these be obtained, and how can problems of
intrumentalisation be avoided, if this turns out
to be the case?
A possible solution could be to use ova from other
species, for instance, cows. But the technique has
46 They only have to say that embryos are not, by definition, similar to
adult human beings, and that they do not, therefore, have all the rights
that adults have. If they are then accused of ‘selective dehumanisation’
(by the use of restrictive definitions), they can argue that the burden of
proof lies with their opponents. Rights are originally associated with
fully-developed human beings, and they are connected with the features
and abilities fully-developed human beings have. Since embryos do not
have these, there are no good grounds to extend full protection to them.
To claim that embryos have full human rights is about as intelligent as
it would be to call the exclusion of trees from the sphere of human rights
‘selective dehumanisation’.
47 They cannot, in other words, decide in a few years’ time to set a new,
later date, which would enable German scientists to exploit the results
of human embryonic stem cell lines created after 1 January 2002. Green
(op. cit. note 17, pp. 552–553) warns about this in analysing President
George W. Bush’s decision to authorise the use of existing stem cell lines
on the grounds that the life-and-death decision has already been made.
48 This type of thinking is usually associated with the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant, who wrote on the topic: ‘[Man] as a person, i.e. as the
subject of a morally-practical reason, is exalted above all price. For as
such a one (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to
the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as
an end in himself. This is to say, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner
worth) whereby he exacts the respect of all other rational beings in the
world, can measure himself against each member of his species and can
esteem himself on a footing of equality with them.’ I. Kant. 1797. The
metaphysical principles of virtue (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der
Tugendlehre), pp. 434–435. In I. Kant. 1994. Ethical Philosophy. Second
edition translated by J.W. Ellington and with an introduction by W.A.
Wick. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company:
p. 97.
49 Heinemann and Honnefelder, op. cit. note 9, p. 542.
50 A recent study seems to indicate, however, that this is not enough for
the German public, who are critical towards all kinds of human embryo
research. Das Institut für Markt- und Politikforschung. 2002. Beuertei-
lung der neuen Moglichkeiten in der Biotechnologie. Bundesweite
Erhebung.
51 Holm, op. cit. note 5, p. 499.
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not yet been perfected, and other kinds of ethical
problems can be involved in the practice.
THE FRAGILITY OF THE GERMAN
POSITION
Is it, in the light of the preceding observations, fair
to say that a morally sound and rationally accept-
able justification for the German legal situation
exists? The answer to this question depends on the
view taken on some of the principles, distinctions
and definitions underlying the Stem Cell Act, and
especially its qualified permission to import materi-
als from other countries.
German legislators tackle the problem of moral
contagion by drawing a line between Germany and
the rest of the world. They seem to think that
although the Nazi past of their own country would
make the domestic production of human embryonic
stem cell lines too symbolically laden, this concern is
not equally momentous elsewhere. Is this a sign of
becoming humility, or is it an expression of assum-
ing self-importance? Interpretations are bound to
vary.
By prohibiting the use of new foreign stem cell
lines the lawgivers refuse to encourage the creation
of such lines by economic incentives or legal
approval. But by allowing the use and purchase of
lines derived in 1998–2001, they condone, and eco-
nomically encourage, the activities of research
groups and companies which may continue to
destroy embryos, possibly aided by payments
coming from Germany. Is there a discrepancy here?
The insistence that human embryos are entitled
to the equal protection of their rights and dignity
conveys the message that human life is equally valu-
able whatever its stage of development. On the other
hand, the production, in fertility treatments, of extra
embryos destined for destruction can be seen to
imply that there is a ranking of values in which
human embryos exceed general scientific aims but
succeed the reproductive needs of their parents. Can
German legislators find a way to hold on to both
models simultaneously?
Both during the preparation of the Stem Cell Act
and after its implementation many Germans have
been worried about the dehumanising, commodify-
ing, and intrumentalising effects of the law. The
response of the legislators seems to be to ensure that
foreign stem cell lines will only be used in research
which directly promotes the health and welfare of
individual human beings. Arguably this commit-
ment, which does definitely not help the destroyed
embryos, only encourages further research into
human embryonic stem cells by highlighting its most
successful aspects.
The causal connection between German legisla-
tion and the evils mentioned here are mostly
unclear; and, at least at the level of law, some sym-
bolic concerns can be addressed by the convenient
formulation of the paragraphs. The disputes are, for
the most part, verbal, and although paradoxes can
be found, their ethical cash value remains contested.
If the legislature’s views on the disputed questions
can be melted into a coherent whole, then there is a
morally and rationally acceptable justification for
the Stem Cell Act. The legislators seem convinced
that is the case. Since others can, however, feasibly
disagree, the German legal position regarding
human embryonic stem cell research remains ethi-
cally fragile.
THE FUTURE IMPORT OF TAINTED
THERAPIES TO GERMANY
The fragility of the German position is especially
clear in the case of possible future stem cell therapies
which will possibly be developed in other countries
by research which would be illegal in Germany.
Could German legislators morally allow the import
of such therapies?
The first reaction, based on the time limit for the
creation of stem cell lines, has to be negative. If it is
wrong to import cell lines derived after 1 January
2002, surely it must be wrong to import therapies
which owe their existence to these forbidden lines.
On the other hand, however, if the German
authorities are right in allowing fertility treatments
and the limited use of human embryonic stem cells
in research, they could also allow the use of tainted
therapies. They could argue that it is more impor-
tant, and hence more acceptable, to use embryos
indirectly as a means, when the aim is concrete
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human well being instead of abstract scientific
progress.
The paradox of this solution is that, according to
their own rules, German authorities cannot even
consider this possibility beforehand – and they may
only get to use it once, if at all. If they admit that
Germany can, in the future, import therapies
derived from forbidden stem cell research, they will,
with this admittance, encourage current and future
destruction of early human embryos. And, this, of
course, is something that they expressly want to
avoid. The only possibility open to them is not to
consider the issue at all, and just wait. The time will
come when the benefits of stem-cell-based therapies
are too prominent to be ignored, and the legislators
can then decide to allow some of these therapies,
maintaining that they have not provided any incen-
tives to the evil activities leading to their creation.
But if the logic used in the Stem Cell Act is adhered
to, the law must then set a time limit, after which the
import of therapies is again banned.
Moral integrity, as understood in individual
ethics, would, no doubt, require the German legis-
lators to anticipate the development of ‘forbidden’
therapies, and to foreclose the option of their use in
Germany in advance. Political nous and the possi-
bility of promoting human welfare in the future,
however, demand a moratorium on hasty, irrevo-
cable decisions. The ensuing legal compromise will,
almost inevitably, have a hypocritical aftertaste.
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